Till April, the Americans and the Iraqis did not know what he looked like, since no reliable pictures of him were available. He was considered highly security-conscious and avoided having himself photographed.
But, surprisingly, on April 26, a website associated with the al Qaeda disseminated a video-recorded message of his showing what he looked like. Presuming that the picture in this video was really that of Zarqawi and that the finger prints used for comparison really belonged to him, the confirmation of his death should be treated as authentic.
It would be too early to say whether he was really killed by the Americans in an air strike as claimed by them or he was killed by the Iraqi resistance fighters, who had reportedly developed differences with him, and his body thrown away to be subsequently recovered by the American and Iraqi forces. The definitive truth relating to his death would never be known.
Presuming that he died, as claimed, in a US air strike, this would have been possible only on the basis of pin-point intelligence, which could have come either from technical gadgets (TECHINT) or human sources (HUMINT).
Even if the successful operation was completely based on TECHINT, the Americans and the Iraqi Government would make it appear as if human sources also played a role in order to create suspicions among the terrorists about a possible mole in their midst.
If this operation was based purely on TECHINT, it is a major tactical success for the US-led coalition. If HUMINT had also played a role, the significance of the success would be greater.
Since last year, there were indications that the al Qaeda leadership in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region as well as the Iraqi resistance fighters were unhappy over some of the methods adopted by Zarqawi.
The virulently anti-Shia direction given by him to the jihad had made Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 to bin Laden in al Qaeda, quite uncomfortable. He had given expression to his misgivings in a letter addressed to Zarqawi.
The Iraqi resistance fighters were reportedly unhappy over his expanding the Iraqi jihad to foreign territories too such as Jordan and over his emphasizing the pan-Islamic dimensions of the jihad instead of the nationalist dimensions.
The resistance fighters projected their jihad as meant to defeat the Americans and liberate Iraq from their occupation. They did not project it as part of the global jihad of the International Islamic Front (IIF) against the Crusaders and the Jewish people.
Zarqawi, with the apparent blessings of bin Laden and Zawahiri, projected the fighting in Iraq as part of the global jihad, thereby downplaying the nationalistic dimensions and getting involved in operations outside Iraq.
The first indications about the disquiet of the resistance fighters over the actions of Zarqawi came from the Jordan-based son of the late Abdullah Azam, the Palestinian terrorist, who played an active role in the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s and was considered by some as one of the mentors of bin Laden.
After almost disappearing from public view for some weeks, Zarqawi re-appeared with his video of April 26. Subsequent events showed that his anti-Shia virulence had increased even further despite the admonition from Zawahiri.
It is against this background that one should view the significant success scored by the Americans and the Iraqis, if al Qaeda admits the death of Zarqawi, which would be the real confirmation.
Zarqawi was not a leader of iconic proportions. He did not command in the Islamic world the kind of respect which bin Laden seems to command. His anti-Shia massacres had made even many Sunnis uncomfortable. Any violent reactions to his death would, therefore, remain limited.
He was the man who was motivating the foreign jihadis operating in Iraq and co-ordinating their operations. He had no visible successor, with equal authority and high profile. That does not mean that his death, if true, could mark the beginning of the end of the Al Qaeda in Iraq.
We would probably see in Iraq a denouement similar to what we have been seeing in Saudi Arabia, where every time a leader, considered important, is killed by the security forces, another person takes up the leadership and keeps the jihad going.
The more the leaders killed by the Saudi security forces, the more the new leaders who have come up and rallied the cadres around and motivated them to keep the jihad going.
Two other questions arise. Would the death of Zarqawi mark the end of the anti-Shia virulence? Would the Iraqi resistance-fighters come to the forefront and impose discipline and control over the foreign terrorists? Not immediately.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri must be worried about their own security.
If Zarqawi's death is admitted by Al Qaeda, whatever be the circumstances under which he died, this will be a shot in the arm for the US and the Iraqi security forces and intelligence.
It is not victory, but it is one important step forward. They are no longer groping in the dark. There is a flicker of light to cheer them.
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